Abstract
Introduction
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was deployed in mid-2003 following a request from the beleaguered Solomon Islands government (SIG). A low-level conflict , known locally as 'the tension', had erupted on the main island of Guadalcanal in late 1998. Groups of young Guadalcanal men, calling themselves the Isatabu Freedom Movement, launched a campaign of violent harassment directed mainly at settlers from the neighbouring island of Malaita. Around 35,000 of these settlers were forcibly evicted from their homes in rural Guadalcanal and the periurban areas surrounding the national capital, Honiara. This provoked the emergence of a rival militia -the Malaita Eagle Force -and over the following two years armed skirmishes occurred between investor-led growth. 4 Ten years later, the mission is in a phase of transition and drawdown. This has entailed a progressive reduction in its size and range of activities, including the complete withdrawal of all remaining military personnel in 2013. Over a four year period -2013-2017 -RAMSI's development programs are being absorbed into regular aid arrangements managed by bilateral and multilateral donors, including Australia. 5 RAMSI's remaining presence during this period will consist of a slimmed down PPF continuing capacity-building work with the RSIPF, primarily in Honiara.
While RAMSI's early success in restoring security has rightly attracted praise, much remains to be done in order to fulfil the mission's longer-term goals for a stable, secure and self-sufficient Solomon
Islands. Outstanding concerns include the sustainability of gains made over the last decade and the extent to which the island nation's own leaders and institutions can maintain and build on these.
Many of the factors that contributed to the original tension in the late 1990s remain and pose a potential threat to future stability. Some of the underlying stresses are likely to become more pronounced in light of projected demographic and economic trends. They include the misalignment between Solomon Islands' small and constrained formal economy and the expectations of its rapidly growing population, the conflict stresses that may follow as the economy shifts from logging to mining, as well as the consistently poor service delivery and development outcomes associated with current forms of political leadership.
These issues will be examined in the context of Solomon Islands' recent history, present circumstances and likely future. The first section looks at some of the main factors and dynamics that contributed to the original tension and that need to be addressed in order to achieve durable peace and stability. Section two looks at RAMSI's activities, impacts and evolution since 2003, while the final section considers the country's prospects in the post-RAMSI era, with a particular view to the implications for international actors.
Background to the Tension
Solomon Islands has never had a fully functioning Weberian state, either in terms of institutional capabilities or the ability to project authority across the length and breadth of the territory.
Although the tension and subsequent breakdown of order from 2000-2003 exacerbated the fragility of the state to the point of collapse, the events that unfolded from the late 1990s were as much a effective demise of the official local-level government system and an important mechanism for the delivery of government services and public works to rural communities.
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Under pressure from the donor community to reduce government expenditure, Area Councils were defunded in 1993 and disbanded altogether between 1996 and 1997.
The Area Councils derived from an older colonial system of indirect administration introduced by the British that also included local courts and officials such as the 'area constables' as part of a devolved administrative system that sought to coordinate a range of agency and services functions at local levels. Following the removal of Area Councils, area constables disappeared in all provinces, with the exception of Renbel. These officials used to assist in the enforcement of council by-laws and local court decisions, performing an important role in dispute resolution and order maintenance, as well as serving as critical intermediaries between customary and state authorities at local levels.
Although they still exist in many areas, local courts have, for the most part, become moribund in the absence of adequate government support.
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While many factors contributed to the tension, 13 it is worth pointing out that the conflict in Guadalcanal occurred shortly after the dissolution of Area
Councils. An association between these events has been drawn by some observers who suggest that the demise of "the local policing and justice systems removed restraints on anti-social behaviour that were formerly available". 14 The retreat of state from rural Solomon Islands provides an important aspect of the broader context of increasing local grievances, contestation and instability in recent decades.
Understanding the political economy behind this retreat is important not only for the light it can shed on the origins of the tension but also for developing a better understanding of what is required to prevent future conflict and instability. Solomon Islands' post-independence political culture and the actions of its political leaders are deeply implicated in these developments. The latter have consistently failed to address the need for effective systems of government administration at provincial and local levels. In many respects, they have actively sought to monopolise the distribution of public resources at the centre, thereby neutralising potential rivals at lower levels. In elections by sitting members seeking to secure electoral advantage over other candidates. Such acts of political gifting inevitably create divisions between beneficiaries and those who lose out at the constituency level. Their usage corrodes bureaucratic service delivery systems and diverts scarce public resources to partisan political ends. Decisions around the distribution of these funds are driven primarily by short-term and parochial political considerations rather than by any larger planning or policy framework. Despite generally unimpressive outcomes in terms of development and service delivery, these funds and other informal sources available to political leaders are now an important aspect of how power actually works in Solomon Islands, and are jealously guarded by their political patrons. Some scholars have argued that the potential disruption to political patronage networks posed by the declining demand for log exports during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and the election of a reformist government, provoked deliberate acts of destabilisation by vested political and business interests and that these, in turn, contributed to the subsequent tension.
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The more familiar narrative of the tension highlights the social stresses associated with internal migration. Solomon Islands' small formal economy -logging, fishing and, increasingly, mining -has failed to match the needs and expectations of its rapidly growing and youthful population. The proposed remedy was a liberal peace intervention with a strong accent on security, state-building and economic reform. nation's sovereignty. 31 Under the FIA Act, the Solomon Islands Parliament was to review RAMSI annually and could, in theory, terminate the mission by revoking its consent.
The mission's wide-ranging mandate combined security and development objectives:
• Ensure the safety and security of Solomon Islands;
• Repair and reform the machinery of government, improve government accountability and improve the delivery of services in urban and provincial areas;
• Improve economic governance and strengthen the government's financial systems;
• Help rebuild the economy and encourage sustainable broad-based growth; and
• Build strong and peaceful communities.
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RAMSI's initial phase, led by the PPF, focused on the restoration of law and order and involved mission police in an executive policing role. This was to be followed by a period of consolidation and institutional reform, and, finally, the building of sustainability and self-sufficiency among Solomon
Islands' own institutions. In addition to the highly visible police and military presence, civilians from a range of Australian government departments 33 were placed as advisers in various ministries and agencies. In this regard, RAMSI has been described as "the most comprehensive whole of government strategy towards a fragile state of any donor to date". 34 As well as Australia's substantial commitment of funds and personnel, no fixed exit date was specified. Security was restored quickly and peacefully. Large numbers of firearms were handed over to mission personnel, while well-known militant leaders were apprehended to be processed subsequently through the criminal courts. This intensive period of law enforcement placed considerable pressure on other parts of the fragile criminal justice system, and the mission placed a number of international personnel in relevant agencies, including as magistrates, lawyers, clerks and prison officials. In addition to their executive policing role, the PPF also began the longer-term task of cleaning up and rebuilding the RSIPF. 35 Over 400 officers resigned or were removed, amounting to more than one quarter of the total workforce. Other early achievements included restoring stability to government finances. Improvements in public financial management and tax collection saw government revenues increase by around 170 per cent during RAMSI's first three years. 36 Legislative and policy provisions were enacted to support private sector investment, while measures were taken to strengthen Solomon Islands' accountability mechanisms, including the Office of the AuditorGeneral, the Ombudsman, and the Leadership Code. 37 Inevitably, there were also set-backs. Serious public disturbances occurred in Honiara in April 2006 following national elections. viewed as Australia's dominant influence. This, in turn, provoked strong resistance from political leaders in Canberra. 39 Although these differences were fought out at the highest levels of the two governments and did not necessarily affect operational relationships, they inevitably cast a shadow over the future of the mission. In doing so, they also exposed the inherent vulnerability of the 'cooperative intervention' model to the vagaries of shifting local political allegiances. 
Changes of government in Australia and

Transition and beyond -Solomon Islands' future prospects
As it marked its tenth anniversary in July 2013, the mission still enjoyed high levels of popular highly professional mission police. 51 The RSIPF inevitably come off worse in such comparisons. An irony here is that the continuing presence of the PPF, whose primary task for some time has been to rebuild the RSIPF, may have served inadvertently to accentuate this lack of confidence on the part of many citizens. Likewise RAMSI's substantial financial and other support to the RSIPF -around twothirds of the total costs 52 -may have reduced the incentive for SIG to adequately resource its own police force.
With much of RAMSI's development work focused on central government agencies in Honiara, many rural Solomon Islanders still face major problems of access to state services. Despite improvements in some areas of service delivery over the past ten years, the country remains in the low human development category and is currently ranked 143 out of 187 countries in the UN's Human Development Index. 53 Difficulties experienced by rural citizens in accessing government services can also be illustrated in relation to state police and justice systems. According to 2010 figures, the RSIPF had some 28 police stations and posts located outside of Honiara in the provinces. 54 The former are usually based in provincial capitals, leaving a scattering of smaller police posts in selected rural areas. Significant disparities exist in the distribution of police personnel and other assets in different parts of the country. For example, just over half the total number of RSIPF officers were stationed in Honiara which is home to less than 20% of the total Solomon Islands population. By contrast, only 7.5% of the police were located in Malaita province with around 30.3% of the national population. It is only recently that more attention has been given to the development of a model of community policing that will be able to extend the reach of the RSIPF across the archipelago and that will be sustainable in light of the fiscal constraints facing SIG.
The limited presence and reach of state agencies in rural communities means that the latter remain largely dependent on their own informal mechanisms and processes. In addition to the findings of The term 'kastom system' is used here to refer to local rule systems whose authority lies in appeals to locally-specific bodies of kastom (custom) or tradition, and that are typically administered by local 'chiefs'. 57 Allen et al., Justice Delivered Locally, pp.34-65. machinery of government and economic governance) have shifted across to bilateral development programs managed out of the Australian and New Zealand High Commissions. During the next four years, RAMSI will consist primarily of a small contingent of Honiara-based PPF providing capacitydevelopment assistance to the RSIPF. This switch in the modality of external assistance signifies the transition from post-conflict stabilisation to a more regular development assistance approach.
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The continuing need for long-term international support is premised on an appreciation of the structural challenges facing the island nation, including its relatively poor economic prospects and the conflict stresses these might induce. Many of the underlying factors that contributed to the original tension remain unaddressed. A recurrence of conflict remains a real risk with international evidence confirming the cyclical character of many conflicts in fragile states. 59 Analysis by the World successful, are unlikely to make up for the shortfall that will result from such a development. As well as the impact on revenue and jobs, the demise of the notoriously corrupt logging industry "is likely to place pressure on local patronage networks and exacerbate socioeconomic grievances, thereby partly recreating conditions that contributed to the original outbreak of violence in the late 1990s". 63 Projections indicate that likely medium-term economic growth will increasingly be concentrated around Honiara, which will attract increasing numbers of migrants from rural areas and around enclave resource development, especially mining. This is likely to deepen historical patterns of uneven development and associated grievances over relative deprivation. Longer-term challenges include the need for Solomon Islands' political and economic elites to provide the leadership and institutional arrangements necessary to achieve positive development outcomes and lasting stability as the country moves into the post-RAMSI future. It is clear that the short-termism, personalised and informal character of 'national' politics as it has evolved during the post-independence period is neither conducive to development nor stability. This includes the corrosive impact on formal delivery systems of the rise of parallel informal institutions such as the constituency development funds. RAMSI's focus on formal institutions and its adoption of a deficit perspective -identifying existing deficiencies and seeking to fix them -has to a large extent neglected local political realities and the way in which power actually works in Solomon Islands.
Development scholars increasingly recognise that the manner in which power is exercised by local 64 elites in fragile and post-conflict settings like Solomon Islands is largely through informal institutional arrangements including patronage and the monetisation of politics. Growing attention is being given to the nexus between politics and institutional reform, with a view to improving understanding of the power relationships that shape statebuilding processes, as well as the formal and informal institutions that underpin institutional inclusiveness, performance and stability. 67 Ensuring alignment between institutions and political power is a necessary basis for building accountable and legitimate institutions capable of delivering public goods on a sustainable basis. 68 In the case of Solomon Islands, development partners need to accept the reality of critical informal institutions such as the discretionary funds available to MPs and devise ways of engaging with them in order to develop accountability mechanisms and improve development outcomes.
RAMSI undoubtedly succeeded in its initial task of restoring security and stability to Solomon Islands but the outstanding challenge remains to sustain and build on these achievements in the years ahead. While the security phase was relatively straightforward, long-term development is much more complex and challenging. It is now acknowledged that while RAMSI will disappear, substantial international engagement will be needed for many years to come in the form of development assistance tailored to Solomon Islands changing circumstances and needs. Fortunately this appears to be recognised by the new Australian government in Canberra, as it was by its predecessor.
